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When NATO formally decided earlier this week to pull out ofAfghanistan in 2014, no less a global realist than Henry Kissingergrumbled that the exit strategy is now "all exit and no strategy." Still, that's preferable to the reverse strategy without any endin sight. Personally, after a decade of listening to the endless debatebetween generals and diplomats over how best to deal withAfghanistan, I've long felt that NATO was never going to find aclear-cut way to end the insurgency no matter how many bright mindswere thrown at the quest. Three years ago I wrote about Afghanistan as a "bits-and-pieceswar" and that's how I still view it. The international coalition was always trying a little of this anda little of that in the 10 years since it initially ousted theTaliban regime. First there was an attempt at nation building by both military andcivilian reform efforts, then counterterrorism, later replaced in anear frenzy by the doctrine of counter-insurgency, or COIN to theinitiated. Years of military spin and optimistic updates were dumped on themedia and politicians to sell each new phase, but all were foundwanting. In reality there were far too many hostile factions within thecountry, as well as too many foreign nations with differingobjectives, too many interfering neighbours with their own agendas,and, above all, too many unknowns in every region of thiswar-ravaged and corrupted land to fit cleanly into anyone'sbig-picture solution. What now? So, what are we left with? Prime Minister Stephen Harper, at the NATO conference in Chicago onMay 21, said Canada would be leaving Afghanistan as soon asfeasible. (Jim Young/Reuters) Well, for starters, the exit isn't actually far off the one thathad been planned for a few years now. Certainly, U.S. President Barack Obama had always talked of 2014 asthe end point for full U.S. combat support, and almost all NATOallies planned to be gone even sooner if possible. That year will bring an uncertain finale for NATO, far short of any"victory." But, in fairness, no sane person had ever promised suchan outcome. What's striking about the new timetable, daringly so to somecritics, is the make-or-break responsibility now being thrown tothe still rather wobbly Afghan security forces. By September, the Afghan National Army is supposed to hit itstarget of 352,000 soldiers. Then by next summer it is to take overleadership of the whole combat mission nationwide. Just a year and a bit after that it will bid farewell to NATO andtake over the civil war against a ruthless and formidably ruggedinsurgency. It won't be entirely alone at that point. For it's already clearthat small groups of U.S. and British special force "advisers" willstay past 2014, along with CIA field experts and private militarycontractors, including mercenaries, from other countries. Also, Washington recently signed a strategic partnership with theKarzai government in Kabul promising training and financialassistance to 2024, and Canada is chipping in $110 million a year for at least three years for the ANA. 'Only security' Still, this handover is a pretty tall order. StabilizingAfghanistan now comes down to a national army formed only over thelast decade from an overwhelmingly illiterate rural population andwhich is often sharply divided on hostile ethnic lines. It's also an army prone to drug use, ill health, remarkably highdesertion rates and, increasingly it is feared, infiltration byTaliban and al-Qaeda operatives. At the same time, thanks to intensive training by Canadian andother NATO soldiers, this is an army that has made some impressivegains of late. Today, half of all ground operations are Afghan-led, including allnight operations, and 65 per cent of populated areas is largelyunder ANA control. But as the months until 2014 tick by, the scramble to prepareAfghan forces has taken on a desperate urgency. NATO commanders are increasingly putting to one side concerns abouteconomic development, education and civil-society reform in orderto throw everything into getting Afghan forces ready for theultimate showdown. "Now, it's only security," a senior military commander told the NewYork Times this week. "How much security can we bring before we gohome. And how quickly can we train up Afghan forces to take over." Targeting the trainers The Taliban are well aware of the stakes here, which is why they'vebeen increasing their efforts to kill NATO trainers wheneverpossible expecting that just the fear of such attacks willcripple the production of new soldiers. That's a huge concern for NATO. An even bigger one is the state ofthe Afghan officer corps, from top generals right down to newlieutenants, who are taking over commands ready or not. Here the greatest single weakness is the shortage of technicalskills and of enough qualified, even just literate, candidates totake modern war training. A Canadian officer, struggling to teach modern signalling torecruits and using word pictures and hand signals, likened thechallenge to "building a plane while flying it." At this juncture, Taliban commanders have the advantage of justhaving to know the traditional basics of guerrilla wars, such asambush planning, field communications and laying bombs, whichhaven't changed much since the 1930s. Afghan army officers have to absorb a dizzying array of technicalskills, including command and control digital communications,air-ground co-ordination, computer networking, maintenance andlarge-scale logistics. Afghanistan has an impressive looking National Military TrainingAcademy, modelled on West Point, no less. The main challenge though is that young and educated Afghans areinclined to shun the military for much higher-paying jobs withforeign firms or diplomatic and aid organizations. Aiming for 'good enough' The outcome of this struggle, of course, may not only depend on themilitary alone. International diplomatic efforts to stabilize the region may yethave some effect, particularly if Pakistan's meddling securityagencies can be brought to heel. Despite much scoffing, there are serious, ongoing attemptsinvolving a half-dozen countries to tempt insurgent forces intopeace negotiations. At the moment, however, NATO is focused on what's the best that canbe hoped for, and a new expression is emerging. It was coined by probably the most prominent military analyst ofthe war, Anthony Cordesman of Washington's Centre for Strategic andInternational Studies, who has just written a paper called "Time toFocus on 'Afghan Good Enough.'" A frequent critic of past military optimism, Cordesman suggeststhat the Afghans, on their own, won't be able to hold all that NATOfought to keep, but they may be able to retain key parts of thewhole. "The real question for everyone now is, can you hold this thingtogether to the point where, yes, the Pakistanis will have someinfluence, and Iran will have major influence in the northwest, andwe'll lose influence in the south and the east but we might be ableto hold onto Kandahar." For him, "that would be Afghan good enough." At this point, for both Obama and NATO, they must feel they'll belucky to get even that much. The e-commerce company in China offers quality products such as China Custom Shaped Balloons , China Giant Advertising Balloon, and more. For more , please visit Advertising Helium Balloons today!
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