British philosopher Gilbert Roland attempted to define the seemingly straightforward concept of “feelings” in his 1951 essay.[1] During that time period, psychology and psychiatry had risen as popular fields, but little work had been done to actually define the components of an “emotion” or a “feeling.” Consequently, Roland set out to establish some constrains on this nebulous subject by suggesting that feelings are distinguished by various bodily or mental sensations. In the first section of this article, Roland presented seven distinct conceptions of “feelings.” It is clear that he put much contemplation in this presentation, for he named usages that would typically escape most people. He began with the common definition of feelings as sensory perception, but he distinguished between uncontrollable instinctual bodily responses and purposeful, thought-out motions to find an object or determine something about an object (e.g., feeling water with one’s fingers to figure out its temperature). In another definition, Roland distinguished between feeling bodily sensations and feeling general conditions, such as sleepy, ill, wide-awake, uneasy, or depressed, deeming the latter to be more “mental.” Furthermore, Roland included idiomatic phrases that incorporated conjugations of “to feel” to remind readers how easy it is to forget figurative usages of common words. There’s “feeling that something is the case” to express a gut inclination that is not yet strong enough to be held as an actual thought or belief. There’s also “feeling like doing something” to express the temptation one has to take an inappropriate action, such as falling asleep in class. These figurative or hypothetical uses of feelings are easily overlooked, so Roland thoughtful inclusion brings useful philosophical insight for other researchers.
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