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Hafle's recollections, taken down by BP investigators, and theassessment of the expert witness, who is the former director ofdrilling research at the University of Tulsa, are contained incourt-sealed filings obtained this week by The Times-Picayune. Theyshed new light on critical decisions by Vidrine, who has refused totestify, citing medical issues. The documents reveal a tragicmisstep and lingering uncertainty from the top rig man in the verysame minute that gas was first detected in the well. And as Vidrine appeals a court order for his medical records to beexamined by an appointed doctor, the evidence about his words anddeeds could be a central part of the federal government's effort toprove that negligence caused the spill. Vidrine's criminal defenseattorney, Bob Habans, said he couldn't comment on pendinglitigation. He also declined to comment about what ails his client. Eleven rig workers were killed in the accident. When the rig sank,the well spewed more than 4 million barrels of crude into the Gulf of Mexico for nearly three months. The government is pursuingbillions of dollars in pollution fines through civil litigation;separately, the Justice Department is also conducting a criminalinvestigation that could yield manslaughter charges. Whether Vidrine's decisions as the night-side well site leader, orthose of the day-side well site leader Robert Kaluza, rise to acriminal level is yet to be seen. BP's own internal investigationlong ago concluded that Vidrine and Kaluza misinterpreted the teststhey ran the afternoon of April 20, and that they explained awaystrange results when they should have recognized the dangers theyportended. But to this point, the evidence suggested the officials,spurred on by specious explanations by Transocean drillers for whypressure readings would appear haywire, never realized they weremaking the wrong call. An investigative report by BP's Mark Bly stated that there was "noevidence that the rig crew or well site leaders consulted anyoneoutside their team about the pressure abnormality." But the sealedcourt documents are the first to show that Vidrine actually askedfor help late in the process and apparently ignored warnings fromHafle, the engineer who designed the well. When Vidrine started his shift at 6 p.m. that day, the crew hadjust used the blowout preventer, a stack of valves and pipes a mileunder the sea, to close off well openings and test the pressure inthe hole below, to make sure the cement linings they had poured hadproperly sealed the well's walls. A successful test would show nopressure on the drill pipe running down into the well and nopressure or fluid flowing into a line on the blowout preventer.Instead, the crew found huge pressure on the drill pipe and none onthe other tube, called the "kill line." Vidrine asked them to run the test again. After a few adjustments,the same odd readings reappeared. Then he called Hafle and talkedwith him for 10 minutes. "Mark said he told Don that you can't have pressure on the drillpipe and zero pressure on the kill line in a test that's properlylined up," said the BP notes of an interview with Hafle on July 8,2010. "Mark said that he told Don he might consider whether he hadtrapped pressure in the line or perhaps he didn't have a valveproperly lined up. Don told Mark that he was fully satisfied thatthe rig crew had performed a successful (pressure) test." Vidrine and Kaluza have refused to testify, but according to Bly'sreport, they were convinced by Transocean's toolpusher and drillerthat pressure on a rubber valve in the blowout preventer wasprobably causing false pressure readings on the drill pipe, aphenomenon they called the "bladder effect." BP and several expertshave subsequently said the bladder effect is a myth. The expert witness for the government -- petroleum engineer J.J.Azar, the retired director of drilling research at Tulsa -- wasquestioned by Justice Department attorneys in December 2011. Hetestified that even his college students should know that thepressure test can't be successful if there's any pressure on thedrill pipe. He added there was only one proper course of action foranyone after seeing the test results they got on the DeepwaterHorizon. "If I was right there on that rig site, whether I was adriller, well site leader, (offshore installation manager),toolpusher, senior toolpusher, and seen that anomaly, I shut thewell down, sir," Azar said. When Vidrine and Hafle hung up, there were still 36 minutes beforenatural gas and oil would push their way from the bottom of thewell to above the blowout preventer's shutoff valves, 47 minutes togo before the first explosion. Once the oil and gas rise above thevalves, closing the well in is tough. But if they're below that,the well can be closed rather quickly, Azar said. In questioningAzar, Justice Department lawyer Mike Underhill suggested that ifVidrine had done what he was supposed to at that point, there wouldhave been plenty of time to get the well back under control. Azarresponded that he couldn't know what Vidrine did after the Haflephone call. And he pointed out that the drilling crew also couldhave stopped the project. Transocean's engineer in charge of the blowout preventer,Christopher Pleasant, testified in 2010 that he agreed with Vidrinethat the second test was successful. Azar also testified that theTransocean drilling crew missed a final chance to close in the wellwhen they noticed the problems about seven minutes before the oiland gas got above the shutoff valves. Justice Department spokesmanWyn Hornbuckle declined to comment on the Azar deposition or theimplications of Vidrine's phone call to Hafle. David Hammer can be reached at or 504.826.3322 . 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